When users experienced a “metallic buzzing” on WhatsApp and Telegram calls starting in Aug. 2025, Russia’s state internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, claimed it was because the platforms acted as aids in alleged fraud and terrorism. Just a week after the initial interference, the Kremlin announced a mandate that the VK messaging app Max would come preinstalled on all devices purchased after Sept. 1. For ordinary Russian users, these disruptions have made once-reliable messaging apps that allowed connection to relatives and outside news a complex and futile endeavor. As these apps have now become practically unusable for Russian citizens, these moves are part of a larger scheme of Russia’s sovereign internet.
Roskomnadzor is Russia’s federal executive body for censoring media and enforcing “sovereign internet” laws. Sovereign internet was a law instated in 2019, where the government organization is able to control Russian networks independent of the global web, aimed at mitigating seemingly unfounded threats. Under the law, Instagram and Facebook were banned after the invasion of Ukraine, and similarly to the gradual disappearance of Western messaging apps, YouTube began slowdowns in 2024 and has now been officially removed from RuNet.
Russia’s actions fit within a broader trend of digital authoritarianism, a global move by governments to oppose free internet access to influence a population and consolidate political power. The weapons of technological control are wielded through tools like surveillance, censorship, and disinformation, and are authoritarian techniques redefined for the contemporary digital age. Digital authoritarianism focuses on moving away from primitive models of censorship towards structural control of networks, for example, Russia’s use of sovereign internet laws to move centralized authority into digital spaces.
Most recently, Roskomnadzor has announced a complete ban on other messaging apps, with WhatsApp saying this has affected 100 million of their own users alone. WhatsApp has attempted to fight back against the restrictions, and many citizens utilize VPNs (Virtual Private Networks), a system Russia is also trying to break down, to remain protected with encrypted data.
Max is a superapp that, beyond its primary role of messaging, also provides users with the ability to transfer money between Russian banks, order food, and schedule doctors’ appointments, creating a platform that is essential to every facet of everyday life. To register for the app, a Russian or Belarusian phone number is necessary; many individuals in occupied regions of Ukraine have also been pushed to use Max, effectively isolating vulnerable communities from having reliable resources, and must now consume state-backed propaganda programs like Ria Novosti.
In a recent press conference, Russia’s primary spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, claimed that Max would affect the country’s ability to spread its propaganda and messaging beyond its borders. Requiring a Russian SIM card to use the app and banning globally used messaging programs means that the tools previously used for disseminating Russian-backed perspectives need to be rethought. While Max has boasted 100 million users on its platform, it is unclear how many of these are outside of Russia and, therefore, how far-reaching the current efforts are.
Russia’s procedure has been a form of soft coercion rather than a force towards new methods. By degrading service quality, dropping calls, and having slow speeds on non-state-sponsored platforms, the government makes it inconvenient and prevents larger dissent by progressively transitioning users.
The employed methods attempt to mask enforcement as convenience and have a profound effect on the population. Through this gradual degradation, media consumption has shifted from seeking diverse viewpoints from family abroad and Telegram channels to relying on a limited narrative of state-aligned resources. The shift does not try to erase prior open access and awareness, but instead creates a constrained choice for citizens. After two decades of political authoritarianism taking over the country, this final move to digital isolation could cause a sense of resignation rather than increased resistance to new systems.
These initiatives are not a unique method of Russia’s authoritarian regime, but instead a seeming trend in powerful authoritarian states. China has been developing the Golden Shield Project, colloquially known as the Great Firewall, since 1998, after there was a rapid growth in internet use and the government believed that it would threaten its authority. The Great Firewall is known as the “most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regime in the world.” China has its own superapp called WeChat that has similar properties to Max with mini apps, ecommerce, and social networking all in one. A key difference between the way these regimes operate is that while Russia has a gradual dissemination of control, China has had a complete ecosystem with early control.
Russia has had to adapt China’s policy because it is making these changes in the 21st century, when its population has already been connected to global systems for decades. While China was able to suppress information in the earlier days of internet development, allowing citizens to be unaccustomed to a world outside of the Firewall, Russia’s slow and steady policy is an attempt to combat the digitalization to which the country is accustomed.
The concerns from using these platforms mainly stem from the lack of end-to-end encryption that allows data to be collected and potentially used against citizens. This level of surveillance goes beyond traditional methods and allows the Kremlin to not only censor information being disseminated but also to catch dissent within the country from initial sources.
The trend of government-controlled media is not unique to Russia or China, as UNESCO found at least 300 shutdowns in more than 54 countries in the past two years. The organization purports that these shutdowns mainly follow periods of protest, like what was seen in Iran in January, or election cycles.
While Russia’s digital ecosystem is becoming increasingly insulated, international bodies can still try to circumvent these restrictions through policy measures. Supporting and continuing to develop VPNs and other encrypted communication platforms can help maintain connections between Russia and the outside world. The structure of Russia’s domestic programs, like Yandex, Russia’s largest search engine, which offers other services like messaging and calling, consolidates state power while also allowing a point of entry for outside engagement. These measures exemplify how even within digital authoritarianism, intervention can challenge the monopoly Russia attempts to create over information.
Russia has followed suit with China’s authoritarian playbook of digital isolation, and both states are moving towards using technology as a primary form of political control. Max is not merely an isolating messaging platform; it is only one example of how governments are able to control digital behavior to push forth their own narratives. With the digital world becoming the prevailing form of communication in daily life, it is important to recognize how simple online interactions and digital consumption are often reflections of an external agenda.
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