Pipe bombs and IEDs have finally ripped apart the West from its African allies. For over a decade, the United States and France have built strategic relationships across the Sahel, pairing counterterror efforts with democratic reform. However, the sheer force of insurgent violence has exposed these partnerships as a failure. Starting in 2020, the conditions for stability imploded, leading to a wave of military coups, which not only overthrew officials in power but also upended longstanding diplomatic partnerships. By 2023, French and American forces were absent from the Sahel, and Russia moved in to fill the security vacuum.
While the West had always tied democracy to its diplomacy, security failures meant that juntas not only sought stronger forces but also looked for different ideological partners. This made Russia appealing on multiple fronts, offering specially trained counterterror units and a promise to prioritize results over rules. Today, the West scrambles to regain its influence in these nations by shifting its normative approach. Yet, the reality of this new diplomatic environment is that, whether the Sahel chooses a transactional or values-based approach, no nation has yet displayed the type of partnership required to extinguish the fire of instability at its root.
Since many post-colonial nations have unique political histories, few are ready for the cut-and-dry democratization the West expects. Similarly, nations with economies built for the colonial era resource extraction are often ill-suited for organic growth or balanced development. Many developing countries have now become reliant on foreign aid or loans based on the same conditional reforms that Western diplomacy requires, and thus aren’t able to access consistent funding or support. This historic burden has bled into the present as the Sahel is consistently ranked among the bottom 30 nations on the human development index. So, as the U.S. and France make security conditional on progressive statebuilding, it’s a tone-deaf demand towards countries like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, who find themselves trying to reconcile their future with their former colonizers.
Most problematically, Western partners are notoriously poor at supporting the institutions they claim to want. As the West’s foreign investment portfolio reflects domestic priorities, we overwhelmingly focused on strengthening military technologies. Therefore, while the West pushed for free and fair elections in the Sahel, mobilizing special forces remained its strategic priority. This over-investment in security was uniquely pervasive for the Sahel because citizens were predisposed to distrust Western intentions, and because force simply isn’t the answer.
As counterintuitive as it may seem, counterterror is not fought on the battlefield; it’s fought in grocery stores, schools, public infrastructure projects, and workplaces. Building a functional state is the first step in stopping recruitment for insurgent groups, which feed on unemployment, resource scarcity, and ideological mismatches between citizens and states. So, while the democratically elected leaders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso focused with Western nations on security initiatives, the lack of economic development waged a silent war against their goal. Democratic reform was largely lost on the people of the Sahel because they felt no economic relief and saw few victories on the battlefield. As the Western nations bolstered defense, they weren’t fighting the cause of terrorism; instead, they ushered in an era of overthrow for the region by giving means to the military and motive to the people.
Of course, as the juntas took hold in the Sahel, pushing out French and American troops and turning toward Russia, the West didn’t meet them with remorse but rather punishment. Throughout the Biden administration, America refused to negotiate with military leaders, imposing harsh sanctions on Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The U.S.’s ability to punish the shift in governance was through the final institutional connection the Sahel had to the West, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But, instead of bending a knee to our last resort effort to force democracy, the Sahelian states doubled down. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso turned inwards, creating the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) while simultaneously leaving ECOWAS, the final nail in the coffin for Western alliances.
The junta consolidated public support by promising more expertise with counterterror operations than their democratically elected counterparts had. The new leadership had policies with few functional differences from the past; yet, citizens remained supportive, desperate for change, and hopeful for transparency. While Russia lacks many of the economic and even military strengths of the U.S. or Europe, its partnership was natural because it lacked conditionality. This new ally for the Sahel was uniquely satisfied with pure resource trading, forming a relationship built on rare-earth minerals and “comprehensive security.” With Putin’s indifference regarding the legitimacy of juntas, Sahelian nations felt that a state was finally meeting them where they were. During the first years of their partnership, progress seemed more and more like a true possibility.
However, Russia’s transactional diplomacy soon failed the AES just as much as the French and American approaches did. By 2022, Russian troops were already so tied up in the Ukrainian war that casualties in the Sahel caused by extremist groups rose 50 percent, underscoring that Russian support was a short-term, Band-Aid solution. The Kremlin and military leaders of the Sahel had fallen back into old habits, investing heavily in military solutions while neglecting systemic change. As it became clear that the circumstances of partnership weren’t the real problem, juntas started to look for multifaceted solutions that moved beyond simply requesting additional arms.
The tides of geopolitical relations are shifting towards transactional diplomacy, and today, there is a harsh undercurrent for the most disadvantaged. Namely, some states have the leverage to demand, while others are forced to settle. Every diplomatic relationship has been poisonous for the Sahel because structural change is conceded while one-dimensional policies are adopted. Whether the Sahel looks to the EU, the United States, Russia, or China for support, its citizens are unlikely to be the top priority.
Therefore, as those in the global north are rarely pressured by the regional instability of West Africa, the cure for Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso will be to find new leverage. The most reasonable path towards a larger voice will be through multinational cooperation within the continent. Since terrorism, economic stability, and political freedom are of direct interest to the nations around the Sahel, they are the best option for support. Rejoining ECOWAS and strengthening ties to the African Union should be these nations’ priority, as a strong coalition will be the only mechanism that can force powerful nations to provide change. Only when the Sahel has the strength to write the terms of its partnerships will it see benefits seep into all corners of the region.
Image Source: Christoph Petit Tesson – Reuters